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An Explication of the Causal Dimension of Drift

Among philosophers, controversy over the notion of drift in population genetics is ongoing.  This is at least partly because the notion of drift has an ambiguous usage among population geneticists.  My goal in this paper is to explicate the causal dimension of drift, to say what causal influences are responsible for the stochasticity in population genetics models.  It is commonplace for population genetics to oppose the influence of selection to that of drift, and to consider how the dynamics of populations are altered when each has greater or lesser influence.  I define the causes that are referred to as drift when researchers speak this way.
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	Some population genetics models represent evolution as a chancy process.  Writers concerned with evolution, and population genetics particularly, often write that such randomness is due to drift.  Drift is held responsible for the stochastic character of population dynamics.  My main aim in what follows is to offer an explication of the causal dimension of the notion of drift.  I say what is being referred to by “drift” when drift is picked out as a cause of randomness.
 “Drift” is used to refer to causal influences over a population with variant members of different types, causes that have three features: they are non-interactive, non-pervasive, and indiscriminate causes (NINPICs).  They are 1) non-interactive insofar as they have the same sort of causal influence on the reproduction of individuals of each type in the population (most are deadly for individuals of all variants); 2) non-pervasive insofar as they affect only some population members in any given generation or time slice; and 3) indiscriminate insofar as they are just as likely to affect one population member as any other population member, regardless of what variant types they are.  I will offer a more sustained discussion of the meanings of the terms in my definition later on at the beginning of section seven.
After some initial stage setting in sections 2 and 3, I consider the use of the notion of drift on the part of population geneticists (sections 4 and 5), and then consider definitions proposed by philosophers (section 6).  To anticipate those discussions, I find that the definitions of drift in population genetics textbooks make it impossible to understand drift as making a causal contribution to population dynamics.  Population geneticists treat drift as itself a kind of dynamics, typically as random changes in allele frequency, and it would be circular to treat drift as a causal contributor to population dynamics when it is defined in this way.  Philosophical characterizations of drift that present it as a cause or a process are not like this, but I find them inadequate to their purpose: when taken literally, they fail to specify correctly what causes are responsible for the stochastic character of population dynamics.  
I seek an understanding of drift that makes sense of why population dynamics are stochastic.  What is it about the sorts of populations we consider in population genetics that makes it reasonable to treat their dynamics as a stochastic affair?  The answer cannot be that they undergo random changes in allele frequency; that is not even a candidate answer to the question.  Equally, the answer cannot be any of those suggested by philosophers because these miss their target; they are candidate answers to my question, but ultimately flawed ones.  As it stands, we know that it makes sense to use stochastic models in population genetics, but we do not know why.  The account of drift I present beginning in section 7 tells you explicitly when to count a causal influence as having the sort of influence that drift has, and why it makes sense to do so.
I am especially interested in how the causes I pick out as constituting drift can be linked to the variance effective population size parameter in population genetics (Nev), which functions in population genetics models to quantify the extent to which population dynamics are a matter of chance.  Nev is the notion we must understand in order to understand the stochastic character of population dynamics​[1]​.  This is because Nev quantifies the extent to which population dynamics are stochastic in the population genetics models we use to make inferences about the dynamics of populations.  So, an understanding of the causes that are quantified by Nev will constitute an understanding of the causes of stochasticity in the dynamics of populations.  We will know why population dynamics are stochastic if we know what causes are captured by the parameter that controls the extent to which population dynamics are stochastic, namely Nev.
The value of Nev that is appropriate for some population is fixed on the basis of derivations of effective population size.  If we want to answer the question of what is responsible for the stochastic character of population dynamics, we had better show how the causes we put forward as responsible for stochasticity impact the value of the parameter that quantifies the extent to which population dynamics are stochastic.  In the final sections of the paper, I show how NINPICs can be connected to Nev through the derivations of Nev that are used to fix the value of that variable.  Specifically, I show how NINPICs affect the variance in progeny number that characterizes a population, Vk, as well as its census population size, Nc, two variables that appear in derivations of Nev and impact its value greatly.

2  Populations and variant types

	Before going any further, I want to fix some vocabulary.  I will use the term “population” to refer to populations of the sort over which we deploy population genetics.  I will also talk in a completely generic way about variant “types” in populations.  Different population genetics models involve picking out different entities as the types whose relative frequencies are tracked.  For instance, some fertility selection models require researchers to keep track of the relative frequency of zygotes in their population, while single locus diploid viability selection can be modeled by using variables that refer only to the relative frequencies of gametes.  Alleles, gametes, zygotes, and mating pairs, are all treated as alternative types whose relative frequencies are captured by variables in standard population genetics models.  There’s nothing in general to say about what sorts of things constitute the types in population genetics, or at least nothing that can be said in short order.
However, I do take it that we deploy the causal notion of drift having already made a decision about what the types in our population are.  We do not first assess what are the stochastic influences on a population and only afterwards decide how to carve up our population into types whose relative frequencies we will represent using variables in equations.  Rather, the opposite is true.  Only once we have decided that we are interested in explaining the dynamics of a pair of neutral alleles, or two different tints of moths, or sickle-cell vs. normal hemoglobin alleles, or long-legged vs. short legged wolves, or linked gene complexes, or whatever, can we then go on to assess what sorts of factors exert directional, stabilizing, and non-directional influences on the dynamics of the types in question.  At the very least, we must have a grip on an instance of genetic variation to deploy population genetics equations, and I claim we single out variations before determining what causal influences to hold responsible for the stochastic character of population dynamics.  
That we should get a grip on variation before deploying population genetics models is not such a strange idea.  Variation is featured in most statements of the requirements for selection (Lewontin [1970]; Maynard Smith [1987]; Okasha [2006]).  Surely we first judge whether some system meets the requirements for selection, and in so doing get a grip on a specific instance of variation, before we determine what sorts of influences over the dynamics of the variant types we have found constitute drift.
To illustrate how types must be singled out before causal influences can be categorized as stochastic or not, consider how the same cause must be treated as having a stochastic influence when one type is targeted, while being treated as having a directional influence when another type is targeted.  Non-neutral genetic variation can act as a stochastic influence on the dynamics of other variant alleles in a population of organisms; selection at one locus induces heightened stochasticity in the dynamics of other loci.  If our interest lies in a pair of neutral alleles, we must understand unlinked non-neutral genetic variation in the population as a stochastic influence over the dynamics of the neutral alleles (Santiago & Caballero [1995]).  If instead we decide that our interest is in the non-neutral variation itself, then the causal influence of the alleles at that locus will be directional or stabilizing.  So only once we have decided what we consider our variant types are we in a position to decide which causal influences count as a stochastic influences and which count as directional/stabilizing ones.  

3  The cause-effect ambiguity of drift

As others have pointed out, the notion of drift is sometimes used by evolutionary geneticists to refer to a cause, and sometimes to an effect (Beatty [1992], p. 36; Plutynski [forthcoming]).  Different philosophers have picked up on these different uses of the notion of drift and have accordingly offered different definitions of drift.  Two pairs of philosophers, Beatty and Millstein on the one hand, and Bouchard and Rosenberg on the other, have offered specifications of the notion of drift that make it a process or a cause, rather than an outcome or an effect.  Brandon, along with Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew, has offered the same effect-based, or outcome-based, definition of drift, characterizing it as deviation from expectation.
We will see shortly that it is standard for population geneticists to talk about drift as a causal influence, one that is contrasted to selection, but recognizing that drift may be used to refer to a cause does not mean that we must jettison effect-based characterizations of drift as ill-conceived.  While Millstein and Brandon have come into conflict over the meaning of drift (Brandon [2005]; Millstein [2005]), I think that this dispute is misplaced.  Millstein and Brandon are targeting different aspects of the meaning of the same term, something that is possible because of indeterminacy in its usage.  Brandon’s effect-based account of drift as deviation from expectation is an explication of one thing we mean by “drift”.  But “drift” is ambiguous; we sometimes also use it to refer to a cause.  Indeed, as we will see in a moment, advocates of effect-based definitions of the drift use “drift” in a causal sense too.  
	Brandon characterizes drift as any deviation from expected levels of reproduction due to sampling error (Brandon [2005]).  Walsh, Lewens and Ariew claim that drift is statistical error:

A series of births, survivals, deaths, and reproduction manifests drift just if the outcome—measured as changes in trait frequencies—diverges from that predicted by differences in fitness. (Walsh et al. [2002], p. 459)

Some population geneticists have offered similar characterizations of drift.  Brandon cites Roughgarden ([1979]) as someone who characterizes drift as he does (Brandon [2005], p. 158), and I have come across at least one other population geneticists who says something similar: ‘Since the population is finite, there is a sampling error or drift dt, associated with the individuals born in year t, due to chance deviations in viability and fertility’ (Hill [1972], p. 278).  Clearly, then, population geneticists sometimes use “drift” to mean deviation from expectation, which makes the definitions of Brandon and the threesome of Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew legitimate.
However, even those philosophers who are on record as advocates of the effect-based definitions of drift at least seem to use the term in its causal sense.  Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew, for instance, write:

A further reason to adopt the statistical conception of selection is that it preserves the presumed explanatory relation between selection and drift.  As we mentioned, drift explains what natural selection cannot in the sense that drift accounts for those differences between the actual outcome of a series of births, deaths, and reproductions and the outcome predicted by differences in trait fitness. (Walsh et al. [2002], p. 465)

So Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew have drift both explaining deviation from expectation and being such deviation.  Brandon claims that drift is deviation from expectation and later, in the same paper, that drift has greater and lesser effects under different circumstances:

Everything else being equal, the greater the selection differentials, the smaller the expected effect of drift.  Conversely, the smaller the selection differentials the greater the effect of drift (everything else being equal). … Indeed, biologists use the term effectively neutral for alleles or traits where the selection differentials are so small relative to the population size that drift is expected to dominate. (Brandon [2005], p. 159)

In a more recent paper, Brandon also deploys what looks like the causal notion of drift in a number of places: ‘Once drift moves the population sufficiently, selection will tend to move it back toward equilibrium’(Brandon & Nijhout [2006], p. 280); ‘When 4Ns ≈ 1, then we can expect both drift and selection to have equivalent effects’ (Brandon & Nijhout [2006], p. 281; see also Richardson [2006], pp. 643-645).  The natural way to make sense of these descriptions of drift as dominating selection, as moving populations, and as having effects is to interpret drift as referring to a causal influence on population dynamics.  What has effects but is not a cause?  However, drift cannot have effects on population dynamics if it is an effect, an evolutionary outcome, specifically deviation from expectation.  That even those who think that drift is an effect cannot help but talk about it as though it were a cause makes it seem all the more as though we do need a causal specification of drift after all.

4  Non-directional factors in Population Genetics

	Like many philosophers, population geneticists often use “drift” in a causal sense, especially when characterizing diffusion theory.  Hedrick discusses how ‘the relative impact of genetic drift and selection varies with the population size’ (Hedrick [2005a], p. 352).  Gillespie characterizes drift as a ‘source of randomness’ (Gillespie [1998], p. 82).  Robertson writes that ‘gene frequency changes under the combined effects of selection and drift due to finite population size are determined to a good approximation by Ns’ (Robertson [1962], p. 222).  In those sorts of usages, “drift” is being used to refer to a certain sort of cause, something that has effects, and something that can contribute to population dynamics alongside selection such that its influence can be combined with it and the extent of its influence contrasted with it.
In population genetics models involving selection and drift operating simultaneously on population dynamics, the influence of drift is quantified by the variance effective population size parameter (Nev).  We will be able to explicate the causal notion of drift when we can say what sorts of causes are in play in populations that have the sort of influence that “drift” is supposed to have in such population genetics models, causes whose influence is quantified by Nev.
I begin with a provisional answer to the question of what makes population dynamics a stochastic affair.  Rice calls selection, mutation, and migration ‘directional factors.’ He contrasts these with drift, which he calls a ‘non-directional process’ and sometimes a ‘non-directional effect’ (Rice [2004], pp. 131-135).  The non-directionality of drift manifests in its tendency to cause the spread of any of the rival types within a population with equal likelihood.  Thus, drift leads to random changes in allele frequency (Gale [1990], p. 13; Gillespie [1998], p. 19; Jacquard [1974], p. 164).  Hartl and Clark put the point in terms of predetermination: ‘Because the sampling process does not change the allele frequencies in a predetermined way, this process is known as random genetic drift’ ([2007], p. 95). 
Instead of picking out drift in terms of the sort of influence that it has, as a non-directional sort of influence, a non-predetermined sort of influence, or a random change-producing sort of influence, we should instead seek a formulation of drift that defines these non-directional factors without appealing to the kind of influence that they have over population dynamics.  A good definition of drift will pick out the non-directional factors in other terms, and accordingly can be used as part of an explanatory account of why population dynamics are stochastic.  If we want to explain why population dynamics involves a non-directional component by appeal to the causal influence of drift, we cannot do so if we define drift as what produces non-directionality.
	The non-directional formulation of drift will be provisionally useful however, because it reminds us of our target: whatever causes we pick out as drift had better have a non-directional influence over population dynamics.  For the time being, calling the factors we seek to define “non-directional” will serve to remind us of the critical feature that the sorts of things we define as drift-type influences had better have.  However, though I deploy it in what follows as a provisional term, “non-directional” remains an imprecise notion.  The safest and clearest way to characterize our explanatory target is by means of the parameter variance effective population size: The “non-directional” influences are the factors whose influence is quantified using Nev.

5  How Nev is used in Population Genetics





with the psi function representing the time-dependent probability distribution function for the relative frequency p of a target allele.  The first term on the right, featuring the M function, governs directional processes, quantifying the tendency for the probability distribution to flow in the direction in which selection and other directional processes (mutation, migration) are working.  The value of the M function is set using deterministic population genetics equations involving fixed relative fitness values, mutation rates, and migration rates.  The second term on the right is the variance term, featuring the V function, which governs how the density of the probability distribution tends to flow into adjacent regions, both to the left and to the right.  The variance term involves “non-directional influences” insofar as it governs the rate of flow of probability from one allele frequency to both higher and lower frequencies.
That the variance term is a function of the second derivative of the probability density function reflects the fact that net flow into a region of the distribution is positive whenever the change in the slope of the distribution at that region is positive, such that there is more net flow into the region than there is out of it.  So if the probability density to the right of a given allele frequency is a little bit smaller than the probability density at the chosen allele frequency, while the density to the left is much larger than the density at the chosen allele frequency, probability will “flow” into the region from the left.  Over time, the non-directional influence captured by the variance term will cause the distribution to spread out (Rice [2004], p. 132); because of drift, the probability flows to unoccupied regions, and to regions where the differences in the differentials between it and surrounding regions is especially large.  The greater the variance term, the greater the probability of finding the allele frequency of the modeled population further from where it was initially likeliest to be found.




Thus, the smaller the value for Nev taken on by a population, the larger is its variance term.  Whatever causes contribute to the value taken on by Nev will thus control the extent to which population dynamics involves the sort of non-directional evolution captured by the variance term in diffusion theory.  




where Nev is the variance effective population size,  p’ is the post-selection adult allele frequency as calculated deterministically, and i = p’∙Nev is the number of A1 alleles (see Hedrick [2005a], p. 351).  Note that selection makes a contribution to population dynamics by determining the value of p’ in the above equation.
When the variance effective population size is large, the probabilities in the transition matrix representing small changes in relative frequency are larger, while the probabilities representing bigger changes in the relative frequency of the allele are smaller.  As Nev gets smaller, the probability of larger changes in relative frequencies between generations grows.  Thus, here again, we see the effective population size controlling the extent to which population dynamics are stochastic, that is, the extent to which population are likely to evolve further from their current relative frequencies.
It should be stressed that what pins down the meaning of “drift” in the causal sense is not the notion of non-directionality or some similar bit of terminology, but instead the role played by Nev in the formal mathematical models of population dynamics such as the ones just discussed.  Nev has definite roles in mathematical modeling, and those causal influences that contribute to the value taken on by populations for Nev contribute in a definite way to population dynamics because Nev has these definite roles.  We can talk informally about the contribution of drift as a “non-directional influence", but the rigor comes from the role played by Nev in mathematical models.  My aim is to say what sorts of causes contribute to the value taken on by Nev for a population, the causes colloquially known as “drift”.

6  Causal conceptions of drift

	I now turn to philosophical accounts of drift in which that notion is presented as a causal notion.  I want to emphasize upfront the extent of agreement between myself and the pairs of writers I critique in what follows, specifically Beatty and Millstein on the one hand, and Rosenberg and Bouchard on the other.  I am confident that I would classify the same causes as instituting drift as do these other authors.  So were we each presented with the same evolutionary scenario, one featuring a population of different types of entities and an array of causal influences over their reproduction, we would all pretty much classify the same causes as instituting drift.  We would all agree in practice over what sorts of things should be characterized as constituting drift.
The dispute I have with these authors is a philosophical dispute concerning the right way to characterize how the causes instituting drift should be distinguished from the rest.  Agreement in practice does not necessarily lead to agreement in principle.  My aim in this critical section is to show that the suggested definitions of drift proffered by these other authors do not, when taken literally, actually pick out the causal influences that they are supposed to pick out.  Their principles do not match our practice, while I suggest that my principle does do so.  
It is easy to understand this form of argument as uncharitable, as an attempt to deliberately misconstrue the intentions of the authors being criticized.  So I want to emphasize that I agree with the intentions of Beatty/Millstein and Rosenberg/Bouchard in offering a causal specification of drift; what we disagree about is execution.  I expose this disagreement by showing that the specifications of drift offered by Beatty/Millstein and Rosenberg/Bouchard have unintended consequences that their authors did not mean for them to have.  To do so, I take their definitions literally.  This can seem unfair because the literal implications of their characterizations of drift fail to match how they pick out drift-type causes in practice, and I am confident that we would largely agree in practice.  However, exposing a philosophical disagreement that hangs over a broader intuitive agreement requires me to engage in a kind of deliberate blindness to our agreement in practice.  By doing so, I can show that their characterizations of drift do not quite function to capture drift as that term is deployed intuitively by us all.

6.1  The Millstein/Beatty conception of drift

The leading causal characterization of drift among philosophers is due to Beatty ([1984]); it has been most ardently defended by Millstein (Millstein [1996], [2002], [2005]).  Millstein and Beatty espouse a characterization of drift as indiscriminate sampling, either parent sampling or gamete sampling.  Indiscriminate sampling is sampling without regard to physical differences or fitness differences (see also Beatty [1984], p. 189; Millstein [1996], p. 612; [2002], p. 35).  I have three problems with the Millstein/Beatty characterization of drift.
	The first difficulty I have with Beatty and Millstein is with the language they use to define drift.   Both authors use of the notion of “physical” in their characterization of drift, but drift is not sampling without regard to physical differences.  Characterizing drift as sampling without regard to fitness differences, as Beatty and Millstein also do, is equally inadequate.  Lastly, Beatty/Millstein characterize selection as a process that can go on in the absence of drift, as one that is opposed to drift, which leads them to consider selection-only processes.  But selection-only processes could not occur in nature.  I discuss these difficulties in turn.

6.1.1  Drift and Physical Differences

Millstein and Beatty are not the only writers who have deployed the notion of physical differences to make sense of drift.  We find similar use of the language of physical differences, though not as part of a definition of drift, in Brandon and Carson’s description of gamete sampling:

Assuming no relevant physical differences among the sperm ... and no such differences among the ova, the sampling of ten sperm from the sperm pool and ten ova from the ova pool will be ‘random.’ (Brandon & Carson [1996], p. 321)

Hodge is another author who isolates drift using the language of physical differences (Hodge [1987], p. 37).  So Beatty and Millstein are not the only ones to think that drift or randomness has something to do with physical differences among population members.
	Among the examples that Millstein and Betty give of causal influences that constitute drift are floods, lightning strikes, droughts, and forest fires (Beatty [1984], pp. 189-192; Millstein [1996], [2002]).  These are exemplars, not phenomena that are invariably responsible for drift.  We can imagine with Sterelny that lightning strikes might institute selection among bowerbirds, should some of them build their bowers from wire (Sterelny [2003]).  The point of discussing the examples of lightning strikes and such is to give us definite contexts in which to discuss the sorts of things that produce drift; it is not to make the naïve assertion that nothing in the world has ever evolved by selection in response to lightning strikes, much less forest fires or flooding.  What I want to evaluate is whether the Beatty/Millstein definition of drift, when taken literally, succeeds in capturing lightning strikes and the other exemplars of drift as falling under the definition.
Can we relate the standard exemplars of drift to the official Millstein/Beatty definition of drift as sampling without regard to physical differences?  Do Millstein and Beatty mean to say that lightning strikes institute sampling without regard to any differences between population members, or without regard to specifically physical differences between them?  The first idea seems clearly wrong.  Organisms get struck by lightning and killed by forest fires and so forth because of differences between them, specifically where they happen to be when the lightning strikes and the forest burns.
Are these differences in location not physical differences then?  This seems wrong too.  Differences in location, the sorts of things that might determine whether or not an organism ends up fried, drowned, or eaten, are physical differences.  If not, what sorts of differences are they?  Are they non-physical differences?  If there even are such things as non-physical differences, they do not matter to population dynamics.  Floods, lightning strikes, droughts, and forest fires are physical phenomena, and an organism in a water-starved chunk of the ecosystem is physically different from another organism in a water-rich area.  Being in an area of the forest that burns, rather than one that does not, is a physical difference too.  These are differences in location, and spatial and temporal locations, or spacetime locations, are precisely the sorts of inputs that we use in physical theory, and changes therein are what we use physical theory to explain.  So drift cannot be sampling without regard to physical differences because physical differences are what matter to which organisms get zapped, shriveled, or roasted.  Besides, being descended from one parent rather than another is surely a physical difference too, and we will see below that such differences can have a huge impact on whether or not an individual survives to reproductive maturity, even in the absence of selection.
It is pretty clear what those who use the language of physical differences are after in their characterization of drift.  Their position is not nonsensical; they have simply chosen the wrong vocabulary with which to express it.  Millstein and Beatty take it that organisms may produce different numbers of offspring because of factors that have nothing to do with selection.  Dark moths are no more likely to find themselves in a forest fire than light ones; forest fires will destroy moths without regard for their differences in tint.  In contrast, predatory birds kill conspicuous moths: light moths are systematically more likely than dark moths to be preyed upon in forests that have been saturated with industrial pollutants.  This sharp contrast in the moth case invites generalization, but we must generalize along the right dimension, and we should not generalize from “tint” to “physical difference”.  Instead, we should recognize that what induces drift is not non-physical; it is instead non-systematic in a sense of “systematic” that needs to be specified.  Drift is in no sense non-physical; it is in some sense non-systematic.
The notion of “physical difference” is too general for the purposes of putting forth a causal conception of drift; sampling without regard to physical differences excludes too much from counting as drift.  Taken literally, it excludes even our exemplary phenomena such as lightning strikes, forest fires, and the like; indeed it would seem to exclude everything relevant to population dynamics from counting as drift.  Once again, I’m sure that Beatty and Millstein did not mean to do this, since they use forest fires and lightning strikes as exemplars of drift.  But that means that their specification of drift has failed to hit its target.  The point is not that Beatty and Millstein lack a reasonable intuitive understanding of drift; the point is simply that talk of sampling without regard to physical differences does not work as an official definition of drift in its causal sense.

6.1.2  Drift and Fitness Differences

	Both Millstein and Beatty also characterize the difference between selection and drift as a distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate sampling processes, with fitness differences making a sampling process discriminate (Beatty [1984], pp. 188; Millstein [2002], p. 35).  However, “fitness” is hardly a reliable term with which to specify the meaning of another piece of contentious vocabulary​[2]​.  What’s more, Beatty and Millstein’s definition of drift as sampling without regard to differences in fitness is an improvement upon their definition of drift as sampling without regard to physical differences only insofar as differences in fitness result from a subset of physical differences.  But which subset of physical differences constitutes fitness differences?  Beatty and Millstein would have to tell us which differences matter to relative fitness in order for us to be able to evaluate their definition of drift as sampling without regard to differences in fitness as a distinct definition from their definition of drift as sampling without regard to physical differences.  Insofar as Millstein and Beatty have not given us a grip on what makes for differences in fitness, they have not explicated drift.

6.1.3  Drift as a Process

Here I am concerned to show that selection and drift should not be considered opposed and autonomous processes.  I myself do not define drift as a process of any sort whatsoever, but the argument here does not show that one cannot define drift as a process.  Rather, what it shows is that one cannot conceive of selection and drift as opposed and autonomous processes such that the former can go on without the latter.
Because Beatty and Millstein oppose selection and drift as distinct processes, it makes sense for them to ask of an evolutionary process whether it counts as a selection process or a drift process.  Evolution is appropriately characterized as a process.  If one conceives of drift and selection as processes too, then it makes sense, at least on a grammatical level, to call an evolutionary process a selection process.  This is problematic because selection never occurs in nature in the absence of drift.
We see process-talk for selection and drift giving Beatty and Millstein trouble in the discussion of the infamous moth scenario considered by Beatty in his seminal ([1984]) paper.  The moth scenario is one in which a population of light and dark moths in a wood of mostly dark trees evolves such that, against the odds, the light moths become more frequent.  What makes the scenario tricky is that the light moths became more frequent because they were light.  They happened mostly to land on light trees where they were invisible to predators.  Is this selection or drift, asks Beatty, saying himself that some evolutionary changes are perhaps to some extent a matter of selection and to some extent a matter of drift, such that the two notions cannot always be distinguished conceptually (Beatty [1984], p. 196).  He is right that the moth scenario does pose conceptual difficulties for those who would conceive of selection and drift as opposed, autonomous processes.
One of Millstein’s aims in her discussion of the notions of drift and selection is to provide a decisive answer to the question, What process is at work in Beatty’s moth scenario?  Millstein claims that selection and drift can be distinguished conceptually and that Beatty’s scenario is an instance of a selection process rather than a drift process.  Her reasoning is this: The dark moths suffered because they failed to blend in with the light trees where the moths happened mostly to land, so the light moths spread in the population because of physical differences between them and the dark moths.  This makes the scenario an instance of selection even though, and perhaps counter-intuitively, selection led the population to evolve in a way that was contrary to expectation.  Note how, for Millstein, a process-based view of selection and drift is important to her take on the moth scenario:

If we consider natural selection and random drift as processes only, the two concepts can be distinguished in Beatty’s example.  On the one hand, we can identify the occurrence of the process of natural selection.  The color difference between the light and the dark moths is causally relevant to the death of the light moths; the light moths died because the predator could distinguish them more easily than the dark moths in an environment where there are greater numbers of dark trees (similarly, the dark moths died in an environment whether the predator could distinguish them less easily).  On the other hand, there is no identifiable process where the physical differences in the population are causally irrelevant to the differences in reproductive success.  Thus, Beatty’s example is not a case of the processes of natural selection and random drift together; it is a case of the process of natural selection alone (with the qualification that since all real populations are finite, we cannot rule the possibility of random drift entirely). (Millstein [2002], p. 42; my italics)

The problem with Millstein’s reasoning is that she leaves it unclear how this scenario could involve “natural selection alone,” selection but not drift, rather than both together.  Unless we imagine it beset by some terrifically hungry predators, the population of moths in question could not have been absolutely free from the influence of the sorts of things that Millstein thinks produce drift, something that Millstein obliquely acknowledges at the end of the above quotation.  Moths are diploid and undergo meiosis, for instance, and meiosis among heterozygotes is responsible for drift.  More generally, the sorts of things that produce drift, such as meiosis, lightning, forest fires, drought, and other such causes, must have been causally relevant to the evolutionary outcome, and these drift-type influences had to go as they did or a different relative frequency of moth morphs would have eventuated.  Accordingly, drift is implicated in the evolutionary outcome, so the scenario could not be one that involves selection only.
Generally, populations in which every last failure to reproduce on the part of every last member result from traits that are under selection are totally unrealistic; indeed they are scarcely imaginable.  So we should never expect to find in nature any populations that are not subject to what Millstein identifies as the sorts of causes that produce drift.
One way to get around the difficulty just rehearsed would be to think of the moth predators and the lightning strikes not as instituting their own sampling processes in moth populations, but as contributing to a single sampling process in which actual reproducers are sampled from candidate ones.  If we conceive of selection and drift as contributors to a single sampling process, we can clearly say what the sample in the sampling process is, and what the population from which it is sampled is.  For discrete generation models, anyhow, the sample is the collection of individuals who produce descendants, while the population from which it is sampled is made up of the gametes and zygotes produced in the previous generation who are candidate contributors to the sample​[3]​.  I find it hard to think of selection and drift as their own distinct sampling processes, instead of as causal influences over a single sampling process, because that would seem to require the existence of distinct samples produced by selection and drift.  
What is especially important is that if we conceive of population dynamics as resulting from a single sampling process, it is less tempting to think of populations as evolving in the absence of drift, since that involves imagining that a host of causal influences over population dynamics are inoperative, including ones, such as meiosis, that we expect to operate even when other causal influences responsible for selection operate too.  In the moth scenario, imagining that selection is acting in the absence of drift amounts to imagining that only the tints of moths matter to their reproduction, and that is quite clearly unrealistic.  

6.1.4  Why should a selection-only process be a stochastic process?

	Millstein’s view that the moth scenario is one in which the process of selection occurs, but not the process of drift, leads to a further difficulty.  She lacks an account of the probabilistic character of evolutionary processes that, like the imaginary moth scenario, are supposed to be selection-only processes, rather than mixed selection/drift processes.  The sorts of things that make population dynamics probabilistic, such as fires, floods, lightning, and the like, constitute drift, and hence are unavailable to explain why selection-only processes are probabilistic.
Millstein claims that we must take seriously the idea that selection processes are probabilistic; like Beatty, she thinks that moth fitnesses can be characterized as probability distributions (Millstein [2002], p. 44).  In most population genetics models at least, fitness coefficients are rational numbers, but even if we grant that it makes sense to think of fitness in the way that she suggests, Millstein is still faced with the question, Why is the moth selection-only scenario one in which we should ascribe probability distributions for relative fitness values to the moths, instead of rational numbers?  Why should selection-only processes be stochastic?  Millstein does not endorse Brandon and Carson’s view that the evolutionary process is fundamentally indeterminisitic (Millstein [2003]), so it is not clear how she can answer that question.  Crucially, she cannot appeal to the sorts of causal influences that constitute drift as being responsible for the stochastic character of selection-only processes.  Again, if we simply conceive of processes involving both selection and drift as involving multiple distinct causal influences, then we can easily say why sampling processes involving selection are stochastic: sampling processes that involve selection always involve a causal contribution from drift too, and it is that contribution that is responsible for the stochasticity.

6.1.5  Drift and indiscriminateness

Millstein and Beatty offer their best explication of drift when they claim that drift is a process that is indiscriminate.  One can arrive at my view if one transforms Millstein and Beatty’s stance that drift is indiscriminate in the following three ways.  First, take it that it is with respect to differences between the types in the model that drift is indiscriminate, rather than with respect to physical differences.  Second, take it that drift consists in causal influences on the contribution of the types to the next generation, rather than consisting in its own sampling process.  Last, break the notion of “indiscriminate” into two components.  A causal influence can have a different influence over individuals of different types featured in a model; it can be interactive.  A causal influence can also be statistically associated with a type in a model; it can affect different types at different rates.  Drift-type causal influences must lack both these features to exert non-directional influences over population dynamics.

6.2  Rosenberg and Bouchard: drift as initial conditions

	I turn now to another causal conception of drift, that of Rosenberg and Bouchard.  I take it that Rosenberg and Bouchard are attempting to capture a legitimate contrast with their characterization of drift, as was the case with Beatty and Millstein.  Furthermore, I again take it that we would mostly agree in practice about what should count as drift in any definite evolutionary scenario.  I mean to criticize Rosenberg and Bouchard on philosophical grounds alone, and I do so by taking their statements literally and showing that their characterizations of fitness differences and drift do not succeed in generating a true contrast between selection and drift, despite the laudable intentions of their authors to do so.  Once again, I am concerned to show that they have not quite picked out the notion of drift with their talk of initial conditions; I do not mean to argue that their view is wholly wrong-headed.  
The notion of drift that Rosenberg has developed with Bouchard is intimately related to the ecological conception of fitness that they together promote.  According to that conception, fitness is based on comparative differences between organisms that are aggregated into fitness differences between types within a population (Rosenberg & Bouchard [2005], p. 350).  Fitness differences are defined this way: ‘a is fitter than b in E = a’s traits result in its solving the design problems set by E more fully that b’s traits’ (Rosenberg & Bouchard [2004], p. 699).  The causes of drift are differences in the ‘initial conditions’ under which selection occurs, as opposed to the comparative differences that constitute fitness differences: 

When organisms of lower fitness leave more offspring than fitter organisms in four consecutive seasons out of say, 1000, then the likely explanation is ‘drift’ – i.e., the initial conditions in those four seasons were not equally distributed among all the possible initial conditions.  This is a causal explanation, and drift – the departure of these initial conditions from equality in proportion among all physically possible initial conditions – is the cause of the departure from the outcome that selection leads one to expect. (Rosenberg & Bouchard [2005], p. 352)

While Rosenberg and Bouchard claim that drift is ‘perfectly easy to understand’ (Rosenberg & Bouchard [2004], p. 704), the Rosenberg/Bouchard conception of drift suffers from a conceptual flaw.  There is potential for overlap between drift and selection in the Rosenberg/Bouchard account: Causal influences may affect the dynamics of populations in the way that is characteristic of how differences in initial conditions do so, despite producing differences in design problem solving ability and hence being the sorts of thing that contribute to relative fitness differences.  Also, one of Rosenberg and Bouchard’s attempt to specify the notion of fitness without appeal to design problem solving ability fails and leaves no room for drift to impact population dynamics.  I rehearse these difficulties in turn.

6.2.1  Design problem-solving ability and drift

Rosenberg and Bouchard fail to generate an opposition between selection and drift with their specifications of those notions.  It is clearly Rosenberg and Bouchard’s intention to offer specifications of drift and selection such that the two can be placed in opposition to one another, so overlap between the criteria for distinguishing these is a real problem.  And of course, we have already seen that population geneticists regularly contrast drift and selection as distinct influences over population dynamics, a practice that is cemented in their use of distinct parameters in formal models for these distinct influences.  So we should be looking for a specification of what causes institute drift such that makes it possible to contrast drift and selection as distinct and opposed.
Rosenberg and Bouchard’s categories of drift and selection will overlap if there are causal influences that count as both.  I claim that there are such causal influences.  Some causal influences should be counted as drift insofar as they have the sort of influence that is characteristic of drift-type causes: they tend to produce a ‘departure from the outcome that selection leads one to expect’ (Rosenberg & Bouchard [2005], p. 352).  To use our provisional term, such causes are non-directional in their influence.  But these same causal influences could also matter to design-problem solving ability, so we would seem to be forced to characterize them as producing differences in fitness too.  Causal influences that matter to design-problem solving ability and have the sort of non-directional influence that drift is supposed to have will fall into both the selection pile and the drift pile.
To see this, note that some organisms will just happen to do a better job of solving some design problems, or just happen to have better equipment for doing so, without these features being caused in the right way to contribute to relative fitness attributions, and hence to be subject to natural selection.  We can draw a fun example of this sort of thing from Gould and Lewontin, who note that the current may shape the phenotypes of sedentary marine organisms, conforming them to what is adaptive for the flow regime where they live (Gould & Lewontin [1979], p. 592).  Presumably, the causal influence of the current does not lead to the sort of evolutionary change in the population that would result from genetic variations that lead to increased adaptation.  Indeed, Lewontin and Gould discuss the case of the marine organisms in order to illustrate how causes other than selection can generate adaptive phenotypes.
Let’s imagine that some marine organisms end up in regions of the ecosystem where the flow regime better conforms their shape to a more adaptive configuration, whereas others end up in regions of the ecosystem where the current does not have this sort of beneficial influence.  Furthermore, let’s imagine that in each generation the good spots and bad spots are allocated randomly to two different types.  Such random allocation of different types to better and worse regions of the ecosystem is surely an instance of drift, an instance of varying “initial conditions” for development that matters to the reproductive output of the population members.  
However, in this case, the lucky marine organisms faced with the beneficial “initial conditions” develop a feature that allows them to solve a design problem better than their counterparts; they are better at clinging to the rock and not getting swept away, surely something that would count as a solution to a design-problem.  If we deploy the Rosenberg and Bouchard conception of relative fitness, we will be forced to consider the differences in design-problem solving ability that result from the influence of the current as contributing to the fitness differences between the types in the model.  This is unsatisfactory because the ecological conditions that produced the improved design problem solving on the part of the fortunate organisms will have a non-directional influence over population dynamics, the sort of influence that is characteristic of drift.  The ecological conditions will not have the sort of influence that is characteristic of selection, which is quantified by relative fitness parameters.  That is to say that the fortunate organisms will not tend to have offspring that are more adaptive than their counterparts, as would be the case were the especially adaptive phenotypes the result of genetic variations.
Initial conditions that contribute to design-problem solving ability have the same impact on population dynamics as do initial conditions that do not do so.  Unequal allocation of initial conditions, whether they affect design-problem solving ability or not, will function as non-directional influences with the potential to cause deviations from expectation.  In short, a cause that improves design problem solving ability will not necessarily impact relative fitness and have a directional or stabilizing influence; it may behave like drift and exert a non-directional influence over population dynamics.  This means we cannot rely on the contrast between initial conditions and traits that contribute to design problem solving to cement the difference between drift and selection.

6.2.2  Supervenience and success





	I now turn to defend my own characterization of the causal dimension of the notion of drift.  Recall that I claim that non-interactive, non-pervasive, indiscriminate causes of the reproduction of population members (NINPICs) are what constitute drift.  I explicate each of the terms in the definition.
	A cause is a non-interactive cause if it affects rival types in the same way.  If it is a killer cause, and most NINPICs will be killer causes, then it must be equally deadly for all population members, regardless of type.  More generally, it must have the same sort of influence on the contribution of individual population members to the next generation, or the next lifecycle stage, regardless of their type.  This is true even if the causal influence serves only to inhibit reproduction somewhat, or actually induces reproduction.
	A cause is non-pervasive provided it does not affect all population members.  Most NINPICs are killer causes and killer causes had better not be pervasive if they are to contribute to the formation of a sample of reproducing adults from a larger sample of candidate gamete and zygote contributors.  Killer causes that affect everyone, kill everyone.
	A cause is indiscriminate if it is just as likely to influence the reproduction of population members, regardless of type, in any given generation or time slice.  Causes that affect the reproduction of population members, and are statistically associated with one of the types in the population such that they are more likely to promote or impede the reproduction of these types, will not count as NINPICs.  Neutral alleles that hitchhike are a good example of entities that spread in a population because of the influence of a discriminate causal influence.
	Having defined NINPICs, I hope that it is fairly intuitive that our exemplars of drift—droughts, lightning strikes, forest fires, and the like—count as non-interactive, non-pervasive, indiscriminate causal influences over population members’ reproduction.  Of course, in cases like that of Sterelny’s imaginary bowerbirds, lightning will not constitute a NINPIC, but recall we are using lightning and the rest as exemplars.  Indeed, much of the point of having a definition of the sorts of causes that constitute drift is to have an explicit rule by which to judge when lightning, or indeed any other causal influence, counts as drift and when it does not.
Meiosis is a NINPIC too: In meiosis, neither parent allele is especially likely to get into descendant cells (making meiosis non-interactive); each bout of meiosis affects only a pair of alleles (making each bout non-pervasive); and there is no statistical association between being one sort of allele and facing meiosis (making it indiscriminate).  Of course, when an allele at a locus is a driving allele, meiosis will not count as a NINPIC because meiosis will function as an interactive causal influence.  Like the lightning strikes, meiosis should be regarded as an exemplar of a cause with a non-directional influence; it is not such a cause in every last population.  Once again, this fact serves to bring out the value of a causal definition of drift: we know when to count meiosis as instituting drift and can offer explicit reasons for doing so in specific cases.

7.1  Why drift is instituted by NINPICs

The argument that NINPICs are what is being referred to as “drift” when that notion is being used in a causal sense is simply that nothing else will do.  Each of the criteria for sorting causes that I deploy, interactivity, discrimination, and pervasiveness, is such that any cause must count as either one or the other.  All causal influences are either interactive or non-interactive.  All causal influences are either discriminate or indiscriminate.  All causal influences are either pervasive or non-pervasive.  However, any cause that counts as either interactive, or pervasive, or discriminate, or any combination of these, simply cannot exert a non-directional influence over population dynamics.  Recall that exerting a non-directional influence over population dynamics is our criterion of adequacy for an explication of the causal dimension of the notion of drift.
	Consider interaction first.  Interactive causes of reproduction among population members have different causal influences on the different types in the population.  Causes with this sort must be handled through the introduction of relative fitness parameters into the model.  By influencing the reproduction of population members in a type-sensitive fashion, as interactive causes must do by definition, they induce the reproduction of one type and impede that of another, at least when these are measured relative to one another.  This sort of influence will be either directional or stabilizing; either way, we can eliminate interactive causes from those that might count as drift.
	Note that we must determine whether or not a cause is interactive by considering whether or not is has different causal effects on the different types picked out in the model because they are the types they are.  It is perhaps natural to evaluate whether or not a causal influence is interactive by considering whether different organisms are likely to respond differently to its influence.  But when determining whether a causal influence counts as interactive, one must pay attention to what have already been picked out as the rival types under consideration.  Even if different organisms respond differently to (say) some disease, when the variant types in the model are variant alleles, and neither allele enhances resistance to the disease, then the disease is a non-interactive causal influence over the dynamics of the variant alleles.  Provided the disease is non-pervasive and indiscriminate too, it will have a non-directional influence on the relative frequency of the target alleles.
Similarly, even if some dark moths react to a causal influence differently than do other moths, dark or light, if they do not do so because they are dark, then the differing reactions that the different moths in the population undergo in response to the causal influence do not constitute evidence that the causal influence interacts with tint.  The non-interactivity criterion is a causal criterion.  Interactive causes must have different influences over the different types in the model because they are the types that they are.  
Continuing the argument that nothing but NINPICs will do to pick out the non-directional influences over population dynamics, I argue that non-interactive causal influences on reproduction that are pervasive cannot induce drift.  Pervasive causes must affect all population members.  Pervasive killer causes cannot contribute to the formation of a sample of reproducing population members from a larger population of candidate reproducers, so they cannot be responsible for drift.  But non-interactive, pervasive causal influences on reproduction that are not killer causes are hard even to imagine.  But even if we imagine some cause that reduces or enhances the contribution on the part of all population members’ to the subsequent generation, without the cause destroying the population entirely, such a cause has no potential to influence which population members form a sample of reproducers from a larger sample of would-be reproducers, and hence it cannot have a non-directional influence over population dynamics.
Non-interactive, discriminate causes cannot produce non-directional evolution either.  If a non-interactive causal influence affects membership in the sample of reproducers, and differentially affects one type of population member such that it strikes one type more often, that cause will either promote or inhibit the spread of the type with which it is statistically associated, depending on whether or not the cause is deleterious or beneficial.  This sort of causal influence produces a directional influence, and hence fails to have the sorts of effects that drift is supposed to have.
	The paradigm case of a non-interactive, non-pervasive, but discriminate causal influence is genetic variation undergoing selection at a locus near to a target locus of interest.  If we have already picked out our rival types as alleles, then other alleles nearby on the chromosome undergoing selection will count as discriminate causal influences over the relative reproduction rates of our target alleles provided that the alleles under selection are statistically associated with our target alleles through linkage.
It is possible to imagine other cases of discriminate causal influences too.  A population might be divided into sub-environments and the types in the population differentially assorted into favorable and unfavorable ones, such that these sub-environments function as discriminate causal influences.  Brandon ([1990]) makes heavy weather out of an imaginary scenario like this with plants and toxic soil.  The key point is that the causes that institute drift are supposed to be non-directional factors, and statistical associations between types and non-interactive causes of reproduction will lead to directional evolution, the spread of one type over the others, at least until the statistical association breaks down through recombination or migration.
	I note that to qualify as a discriminate causal influence over population members’ reproduction, a causal influence must be systematically associated with some type in the population.  The systematic association must arise from some structural feature of the population, typically linkage or hierarchical structure.  That a causal influence should simply turn out to differentially affect the reproduction of types in the population in some generation does not mean it should be counted as a discriminate causal influence.  NINPICs could not have any impact on population dynamics at all if they were excluded, by definition, from having any differential impact on the reproduction of types.
In sum, then, NINPICs are the causal influences responsible for drift, because any causal influence that is interactive, pervasive, or discriminate cannot have a non-directional influence over population dynamics.  Recall from the earlier discussion of the Millstein/Beatty view that I claimed that drift-type causes were non-systematic, in a sense of non-systematic that needed to be specified.  It is by virtue of being non-interactive, non-pervasive, and indiscriminate that causes are non-systematic in the right way to capture the causal notion of drift.  Notice, too, that any population can be subject to the influence of NINPICs no matter what other directional or stabilizing causal influences are at work, so there is no difficulty in talking about how NINPICs and other causes can occur at the same time and can contribute to the same sampling process.  Indeed, that is just what is going on when we use a single equation to represent a sampling process, but one to which selection and drift both make a contribution (as discussed in Section Five above).

7.2  How NINPICS work

	In the introduction, I promised to spell out how the things that I claim fit the causal notion of drift impact the value a population takes on for its variance effective population size (Nev).  It is surely a criterion of adequacy for a causal account of drift that the connection between what is the proposed cause of drift and the population genetics parameter Nev can be secured.  Accordingly, in the following sections I first discuss how NINPICs contribute to the sampling process that drives evolution in natural populations.  I then discuss how the derivational techniques used to fix values for Nev reflect the impact of NINPICs.  Specifically, I pick out two causal routes by which NINPICs exert a measurable, even experimentally controllable, influence on variance effective population size.  Understanding how these mechanisms of influence operate, however, demands a prior understanding of how the dynamics of populations are driven by a sampling process, so I first describe how this sampling process works.

7.3  NINPICs and random sampling

	The dynamics of populations are caused by sampling; Millstein and Beatty were right on that score.  In gamete sampling, NINPICs contribute to the reduction of a population of gametes to a sample of gametes.  In many populations, gametes combine, usually in pairs, to form zygotes​[4]​.  In these cases, ones that I will treat as paradigmatic in what follows, zygote sampling follows gamete sampling, in which a sample of zygote reproducers is formed from a larger population of candidate reproducers.
Beatty ([1984]) contrasted gamete sampling with parent sampling, but it would be better to contrast gamete sampling with zygote sampling.  For one thing, we use the term “zygotic selection” to refer to selection at the same point in the lifecycle (Christiansen & Prout [2000]).  But also, it is gametes that are destroyed in gamete sampling and zygotes that are destroyed in zygote sampling, inviting a parallel nomenclature.  So in zygote sampling, NINPICs contribute to the creation of a sample of reproducing adults principally by destroying zygotes while in gamete sampling they contribute to the formation of a sample of zygotes principally by destroying gametes.  
That the sampling process that drives evolution is one in which a large population of gametes is sampled to produce a smaller population of zygotes, which in turn is sampled to produce an even smaller population of adults, is seemingly overlooked by Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew when they write:

A lightning strike might take a very small random sample of the population, one that misrepresents the frequencies of traits in the population as a whole.  This really is ‘sampling error.’  But other putative forms of drift don’t have this feature.  When drift occurs as a consequence of small overall population size there is no larger population literally being sampled. (Walsh et al. [2002], p. 459)

But even a population of small census size is one in which the number of gametes produced is always larger, indeed often much larger, than the population’s census size.  It is from the larger populations of gametes, then zygotes, that the population of adults is sampled, and it is this sampling process, one to which NINPICs make a contribution, which drives population dynamics.  
NINPICs exert their influence principally by killing off gametes prior to fertilization and killing off zygotes prior to maturity, thereby keeping them from contributing to the sample of reproducing adults that gives rise to the next generation.  There is no conceptual difference between forming a sample by excluding a portion of the candidate members and forming a sample by “choosing” the ones that do not get excluded.  So even though the NINPICs that are operative in a population together have a destructive influence over the lives of gametes and zygotes, they effectively form a sample of reproducers from them nonetheless.
It should be added, lastly, that the members of the sample of reproducers chosen from the candidates need not all reproduce to the same extent.  The sample of reproducers is rarely homogenous one.  Indeed, as we will see in the next subsection, the extent to which there is variation among the reproducers in terms of how many progeny they have apiece may itself be contingent upon the action of NINPICs.  It is a worthy feature of NINPICs that they are defined broadly enough that they may matter not only to who reproduces but also how much they reproduce apiece.  Birth control, discussed at the end of the next subsection, is a definite example of a NINPIC that contributes to Nev by impacting the distribution of offspring number among the population members that make it into the sample of reproducers.

7.4  Independent sampling and effective population size

In conceptually basic cases, population members in the next generation are determined by means of independent sampling.  The idea is to begin with the case of neutral alleles in generation t and treat the alleles that make up the initial members of generation t +1 as each being equally likely to be the descendants of each of the alleles in generation t.  One can think of the alleles in generation t as forming a pool from which random draws are made.  Any allele selected produces a descendant that forms part of the next generation.  The chosen allele is then tossed back into the pool, and another draw is made, an allele selected, a descendant from that allele placed in the subsequent generation, the allele tossed back, and so on until a complete set of alleles comprising generation t +1 has been drawn.  Alternatively, we can think of the alleles in generation t as producing each a very large number of descendants from which the alleles making up the next generation are drawn.  The gamete pool has to be large enough that what is going on is essentially random sampling with replacement (Rice [2004], p. 73).  The sort of idealized sampling procedure just considered requires ascribing to each organism a Poisson distribution of offspring contributed to the next generation (Rice [2004], p. 116).
In natural populations, NINPICs will produce an independent sample only if they are just as likely to destroy each candidate member of the sample of reproducers, no matter what other members have already been killed off.  So zygote sampling in inbred populations, for instance, does not constitute independent sampling of alleles, because “choosing” one allele increases the probability of choosing another of the same sort (Gale 1990, 22).  This is because most of the alleles are packaged together with an allele of the same sort within organisms so that the NINPICs responsible for zygote sampling will tend to destroy two alleles of the same sort at once.
Because natural populations are not necessarily ones in which independent sampling is going on, we cannot formulate an adequate causal notion of drift by appeal to the notion of independent sampling.  What institutes drift in nature need not institute an independent sampling process.  However, a failure of sampling independence does not necessarily produce bias in the sampling process; independent sampling is not a condition for unbiased sampling.  
Despite the fact that population dynamics are not the result of independent sampling, the analytic results derived using the Wright-Fisher discrete generation model, and the diffusion approximation to it, do depend upon conceiving of population dynamics as the result of independent sampling.  Independent sampling processes are ones for which the binomial sampling formula can be used to generate the probability transition matrix, ones for which the variance in the distribution of next generation relative frequency for a target allele is a known function of relative frequency and population size variables.  Similarly, if we want to combine selection and drift together in diffusion theory, we need formulas for fixing values for M and V in diffusion equations, and it is the binomial sampling formula that allows us to fill in V.
The solution to the difficulties presented by non-independent sampling are tackled by conceiving of populations in which independent sampling is not going on as ones that are of a different size, ones with an effective size equal to the population size they would have were their dynamics a matter of independent sampling.  With variance effective population size, the idea is to exploit the formula for the binomial sampling variance backwards, such that, for diploids, with two alleles per organism (hence the coefficient of 2 in the denominator on the right), Nev is expressed this way (Ewens [2004], p. 120):

The use of effective population size parameters in population genetics allows us to adjust the extent to which the dynamics of a population is stochastic in the face of a sampling process that is not in reality an independent sampling process.  Derivations of effective population size are then sought; ones that take into account how various demographic parameters impact the extent to which a sampling process deviates from an independent one.

7.5  Variance in progeny number

	I now turn to explicate the first way in which NINPICs impact the sampling process that causes population dynamics.  My aim is to show why it makes sense to think of Nev as quantifying the causal influence of NINPICs by showing how Nev is sensitive to the character of the NINPICs that operate within a population.  As will be explained in this subsection, one way that NINPICs impact Nev, and hence the extent to which the dynamics of populations are stochastic, is by impacting how closely the sampling process that drives population dynamics resembles an independent sampling process.  NINPICs institute a regime of non-independent sampling by inflating, or in rare cases diminishing, the variance in progeny number per parent in populations.  (Variance in progeny number = variance in offspring number = variance in family size = Vk.)
Some dependencies in the sampling process, ones relevant to the value of Nev, can be captured in derivations of effective population size through the variable, Vk, variance in progeny number.  Derivations of effective population size must either include a variable for variance in progeny number or depend upon the assumption that this variable has a Poisson distribution (see discussion in Rice [2004], pp. 114-117).  The most basic formula for effective population size that includes a variable representing variance in progeny number explicitly is this one:

Nev ≈ (4Nc – 2) / (Vk + 2)

where Nc is census population size (Hedrick [2005b]).  (For a derivation of this formula, see the appendix.)  The dependence between Nev and Vk is such that, in the extreme case in which variance in progeny number is maximized, such that all the offspring in each generation have a single parent, census population size is effectively irrelevant to the extent to which population dynamics are stochastic because Vk becomes 4Nc – 4 (Hedrick [2005b]).  
While Nev depends on variance in progeny number, Vk in turn depends on the character of the NINPICs that operate within a population.  It is rare for NINPICs to institute an independent sampling process; the effective size of most populations is a tenth of their census size, and this is often the result of elevated variances in progeny number (Frankham [1995]).  Hedrick writes that non-Poisson distributions of progeny per parent occur because of genetic, environmental, ecological factors (Hedrick [2005b]).  Similarly, Frankham asserts: 

Estimates of Ne are expected to depend on the environmental conditions experienced by populations.  Climactic conditions are likely to affect birth and death rates, variance in family sizes, and perhaps mating patterns in different years and habitats. (Frankham [1995], p. 101)

When the causal influences that Frankham and Hedrick discuss are non-interactive and indiscriminate, they will count as NINPICs.  So NINPICs impact Nev by impacting variance in progeny number; the influence of NINPICs over Vk is one mechanism by which NINPICs impact Nev and hence the extent to which population dynamics are a stochastic affair.
	Variance in progeny number, and by extension Nev, is especially sensitive to whether NINPICs impact multiple individuals at once, and whether the individuals impacted tend to be of the same type.  NINPICs can dramatically affect variance in progeny number by destroying multiple gametes or zygotes at once when these are especially likely to be descended from the same parents.  When the number of related zygotes or gametes killed off by NINPICs is especially high, Nev can be five or six orders of magnitude lower than the population’s census size.
As an extreme example of this sort of thing, consider the Hedgecock effect.  Hedgecock ([1994]) characterized populations of some marine animals as participating in a reproductive “sweepstakes” where the very small proportion of “winners” become the parents of the entire next generation.  Such a sweepstakes-like reproduction system is made possible in part by high fecundity on the part of the organisms, but it also requires oceanographic processes and conditions of a particular character, ones that cause variations in gonad maturation, spawning, fertilization, and massive mortality among larvae (Hedgecock [1994], p. 123).  These ecological conditions, possibly including variations in food availability and physical transport of larvae, conspire together to decrease the effective population size of the marine organisms by producing the conditions characteristic of sweepstakes reproduction, where a few parents have all the offspring.  The ecological conditions of the sea that are responsible for this phenomenon are NINPICs: they thwart the reproduction of most, but not all, population members (they are non-pervasive); over many generations, they are just as likely to sweep away to oblivion the gametes and larvae of one type of sea creature as another (they are indiscriminate); and, since it is reasonable to presume that no population members can somehow control where their gametes and larvae end up, the oceanographic conditions have the same effects on every population member no matter what type it is (they are non-interactive).  
	There are of course tamer examples of how NINPICs impact Vk.  Nest predators and brood parasites can institute a regime in which whole broods or clutches of interrelated zygotes perish or survive as groups (Hedrick [2005b]).  In these cases, NINPICs are producing a less severe deviation from independent sampling than is produced under sweepstakes reproduction, so that variance in progeny number per parent is less elevated than it is in the aquatic contexts Hedgecock investigated.  But nonetheless, the same mechanism is at work: the way that nest predators impact the reduction a population of zygotes to a population of reproducing adults by killing several relatives at once affects the variance in progeny number per parent in the population, which in turns impacts Nev.
NINPICs mostly function in destructive sampling, reducing a large population of gametes and then zygotes to a smaller population of mature reproducing adults by killing them.  However, a cause need not function in this way to count as a NINPIC.  One advantage of the definition I deploy is that NINPICs are defined at a level of abstraction such that they need not contribute to population dynamics by being directly involved in determining which candidate reproducers form the sample of actual reproducers.  A cause need not have an immediate effect on the survival and reproduction of population members to count as a NINPIC.  Some NINPICs may function to constrain the impact of other NINPICs on variance in progeny number, and thereby serve to reduce the variance in progeny per parent within some population.  Birth control increases the effective size of human populations (Imaizumi et al. [1970]), and I take it that it does so by mitigating the effects of other random influences on progeny number per parent.  
The connection between NINPICs and Vk, and hence Nev, can be further strengthened.  According to the manipulationist conception of causality (e.g., Woodward [2003]), NINPICs constitute a causal influence on population dynamics insofar as interventions on NINPICs can be used to alter future relative frequency distributions​[5]​.  Remove the nest predators from a population and Nev should go up; ban birth control and Nev should go down.  Buri ([1956]) hypothesized that the limited availability of egg deposition sites within his fly bottles was the reason why the effective sizes of his experimental populations of fruit flies differed from their census sizes.  He ran two separate series of his bottled flies in his experimental demonstration of drift, and the ones in the larger bottles exhibited a higher effective size to census size ratio.  So here we have an instance of actual experimental manipulation of a NINPIC, availability of egg deposition sites controlled through bottle size, showing its impact on effective population size.  

7.6  Population effects of NINPICs

Another important fashion in which NINPICs impact Nev is through their influence over census population size.  By contributing to the reduction of a larger population of would-be reproducers to a smaller population of reproducing adults, NINPICs control the census population size of natural populations, and census population size and variance effective population size are always proportional.  While some populations are limited in size by the operation of a single causal influence, such as the availability of egg deposition sites in Buri’s experimental fruit fly populations, the census size of other populations may be sensitive to a wide-range of NINPICs, the hypothetical addition or removal of which would lead to a corresponding expansion of, or reduction in, both census and effective population sizes.
Because NINPICs may impact the overall census size of a population, populations of competitors may undergo fluctuations in census size due to fluctuations in the impact of NINPICs.  In his review of estimates of Nev for wild populations, Frankham singles out fluctuations in population size as the factor with the greatest impact on the ratio of effective to census size of natural populations (Frankham [1995], pp. 100-101).  He mentions droughts, extreme winters, floods, hurricanes, parasites and disease as agents of population fluctuation (Frankham [1995], p. 100).  For types that are not differentially susceptible to these environmental hazards, the influences Frankham lists will count as NINPICs.  By virtue of controlling Nc and producing fluctuations therein, NINPICs impact Nev.  Reissman and Forber ([2005]) have discussed a case of experimenters exerting control over drift by way of controlling the census population size of founding populations.

8  NINPICs and the stochastic character of selection theory

	NINPICs are the influences that Rice calls “non-directional”; they explain the stochasticity in population genetics.  However, I want to stress that, while I have characterized Nev as representing the causal influence of NINPICs on population dynamics, Nev is nonetheless sensitive to other causal influences too.  Discriminate causal influences, such as those produced by linkage of target alleles to other alleles undergoing selection, impact the effective size of the target allele populations (Santiago & Caballero [1998]).   Furthermore, population size and fluctuations therein provide mechanisms by which any sort of causal influence can impact Nev, and not all of these influences must be NINPICs.  And of course many demographic features of a population impact Nev too.  I have already discussed how inbreeding produces a situation in which alleles of the same sort tend to be destroyed by NINPICs together; sex ratio bias impacts Nev too.  I point these things out so that it is clear that my claim that NINPICs explain the stochasticity in population genetics is not based on the stance that NINPICs, and only NINPICs, impact the value taken by a population for Nev.
My thesis is this: the fact that NINPICs beset a population makes it make sense to treat the dynamics of that population as a stochastic affair.  I do not claim that there are not alternative treatments of the dynamics of natural populations, real or imaginary, that do not involve probabilities.  I claim only that when we deploy selection theory, what licenses our deployment of the sorts of probabilities we deploy as part of the theory is that populations are invariably beset by NINPICs.
















The probability of initially drawing at random one of the gametes of the ith parent is ki/2N, the number of gametes the ith parent produces divided by the number of gametes in total.  Having drawn that gamete, the pool of available gametes for the second draw is one gamete smaller, consisting now of 2N – 1 gametes; the number of gametes in the pool descended from the ith parent is one less too.  So the probability of drawing another gamete with the same parent as the first is (ki –1)/(2N – 1).  The probability of both events in sequence is just the product of each event separately, giving the expression from the above equation.












At this point, we have an abstract expression for the probability of randomly drawing two gametes from the same parent in our population, which can have any degree of variance in offspring number per parent because we have set things up so that quantity is expressed by a variable.  We further know, from the statistical theory of independent sampling processes, that the probability of drawing two gametes from the same parent when the gametes are sampled independently is 1/N.  This makes sense, because the independent sampling process with replacement is such that there are two descendants per parent on average, so that you have a 2 in 2N chance of getting a descendant of the same parent on the second draw, having gotten an arbitrary gamete on the first draw.




The second gives a value of 1/N.  Setting these values equal to one another gives the following formula for the effective size of a population with an arbitrary variance in offspring number: 





Thanks to several anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions for improvements to this paper.
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^1	  There are multiple effective population sizes in population genetics, but the variance effective population size is the one that is used in models that combine drift and selection, the models that are most difficult to understand in causal terms, so I focus on Nev.  Equally, in what follows I consider the role of Nev only in the context of two approaches to modeling population dynamics, Wright-Fisher models and diffusion theory.  However, I do expect the conclusions I draw about drift to hold more broadly.
^2	  Millstein recognizes the contentious nature of the notion of fitness and for this reason avoids it in later work (Millstein [2006], p. 643)
^3	  I discuss the sampling process that drives population dynamics more thoroughly in Section Seven.
^4	  So far, I have been speaking casually and talking about NINPICs as influencing relative reproduction rates, but technically, the NINPICs that impact which gametes form zygotes will impact the zygote formation rates of the gametes.
^5	  While I am committed to the Woodward conception of causality, one need not endorse it to endorse the connection between NINPICs and stochasticity that I am urging.  The argument in this paragraph is simply intended to bolster the case among those who already endorse a manipulationist conception of causality.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